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Abstract 
Normative environments are used to regulate multi-
agent interactions. In business encounters, agents 
representing business entities make contracts including 
norms that prescribe what agents should do. Agent 
autonomy, however, gives agents the ability to decide 
whether they fulfill or violate their commitments. In 
this paper we present an adaptive mechanism that 
enables a normative framework to change deterrence 
sanctions according to an agent population, in order 
to preclude agents from exploiting potential normative 
flaws. The system tries to avoid institutional control 
beyond what is strictly necessary, seeking to maximize 
agent contracting activity while ensuring a certain 
commitment compliance level, when agents have 
unknown risk and social attitudes. 
1. Introduction 
Multi-agent systems applied to B2B have been 
widely studied (e.g. [1, 2]). Interaction infrastructures 
for autonomous agents representing real-world business 
entities (such as enterprises) have been developed (e.g. 
[3, 4]), including negotiation and contracting facilities. 
Normative environments are middleware that provide 
support for making agents’ mutual commitments 
explicit. Those commitments are expressed as norms 
(behavior prescription rules), which can be assembled 
in contracts. Furthermore, when embedded in some 
notion of “institution”, normative environments take an 
active role in checking agents’ compliance with their 
commitments. As such, electronic institutions [5, 6] 
have been developed with norm monitoring and 
enforcement facilities in place, with the aim of 
establishing trust among participants in a norm-
regulated relationship, giving contracts a binding force. 
Another important facet of an electronic institution 
is its ability to facilitate contract establishment, by 
providing a normative framework [6]. This way, agents 
need not specify all norms applicable to their contracts, 
but may instead rely on a normative background. This 
feature is especially important when considering 
contrary-to-duty situations, which typically should not 
be likely to occur. A contract’s normative structure will 
certainly reflect the coarse business workflow between 
the involved agents, but will probably include 
provisions for the most likely possible violations only. 
Further contingencies will often not be dealt with when 
establishing a contract, because it may be costly or 
even impossible to anticipate them. 
Normative environments can provide trust by using 
different enforcement mechanisms. One such 
mechanism consists of making sure that norms are 
applied as defined in a contractual relationship. Some 
of those norms will state what agents should do when 
they violate some obligation (e.g., if an agent fails to 
deliver a good that has been promised, he should return 
the payment he has received with a 10% increase). 
These norms are known as contrary-to-duties. 
However, as mentioned above, in certain cases there 
will be no specified consequence. This is when other 
coercive approaches may be relevant, in situations 
where agents try to take advantage of their potential 
gain when violating norms (because they might be 
more self-interested than socially concerned). 
In the literature (e.g. [7, 8]) we find, among others, 
two basic kinds of sanctions that an institution may 
apply in order to incentive norm compliance (or, to put 
it another way, to discourage deviations). Direct 
material sanctions have an immediate effect, and 
consist of affecting the resources an agent has (e.g. by 
applying fines). Indirect social sanctions, such as 
changing an agent’s reputation, may have an effect that 
extends through time. Depending on the domain and on 
the set of agents that inhabit the institutional 
environment, the effectiveness of such sanctions may 
be different: if agents are not able to take advantage of 
other agents’ reputation information, material sanctions 
should be used insteadhnology
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There are two general policies used when applying 
(direct) sanctions, which concern their intended effects: 
(i) deterrence aims at punishing the violator so as to 
discourage future violations; (ii) retribution aims at 
compensating the addressee of the violation. Bringing 
these policies to the electronic institution realm, we 
consider that retribution sanctions are those specified in 
contractual norms, be they negotiated or inherited from 
a preexistent normative framework. In this case the 
institution, while monitoring norm compliance, acts as 
a mediator. As for deterrence sanctions, they will be 
applied by the institution itself, and may be used so as 
to maintain order (by motivating agents to comply) and 
consequently trust in the system. A similar distinction 
is made in [9], where active sanctions describe actions 
to be performed by the violator (and if he does so the 
violation will become extinguished) and passive 
sanctions describe actions that the norm enforcer is 
authorized to perform. 
Economic approaches to law enforcement have 
suggested analyzing sanctions and their amplitude by 
taking into account their effects on parties’ activities. 
Agents committing to norms that have associated 
deterrence sanctions enter risky activities, because they 
may unintentionally violate them. It has been argued 
[10] that under strict liability (where violators are 
always sanctioned) sanctions should equal harm done. 
An increase in the level of activity brings an increase in 
the expected harm; if damages equal harm, parties will 
have socially correct incentives to engage in risky 
activities (that is, to establish commitments). However, 
this conclusion relies on the additional assumption that 
parties are risk-neutral. If they are risk-averse, the 
optimal level of damages tends to be lower than harm. 
This comes from the fact that with risk-aversion, a 
sanction imposes a cost which does not exist under risk 
neutrality. As explained in [11], risk-aversion 
introduces costless deterrence and the policy-maker (an 
electronic institution in our case) should take that into 
account when choosing the optimal sanction. 
The presence of social sanctions will also influence 
the behavior of agents concerning their commitments. 
Reputation-aware environments should have a lesser 
need for deterrence sanctions (see, for instance, [12]). 
Besides reducing agents’ risk (see above), this 
reduction in deterrence measures may be important for 
other reasons. On one hand, both the enforcement 
activities and the completion of direct sanctions may be 
costly, which asks for either lowering the resources 
used in those activities or eliminating sanctions in non-
compensating cases. On the other hand, we can imagine 
(at least in theory) a computational system where these 
costs can be marginal: assuming that automatic norm 
monitoring is computationally inexpensive and that 
sanctions consist e.g. of fines that are debited from 
agents’ accounts administered by the system. But in 
this case, higher fine levels require higher financial 
warranties from agents, which may once again decrease 
their level of activity: some agents may not meet such 
requirements, which will inhibit them from committing 
to certain normative relationships. 
In this paper we seek to explore these issues inside 
an institutional environment, under the following 
assumptions: 
- Strict liability: a norm violation is always detected. 
- Costless enforcement: monitoring and sanctioning 
have a negligible cost to the institution. 
- Unknown agent population: concerning agents’ 
risk tolerance and social awareness. 
We envisage a normative framework that is able to 
adapt itself (by changing applicable sanctions) 
according to some measurement of success, which will 
have to manage the following conflicting goals: i) keep 
the normative framework as simple as possible, by 
avoiding over-constraining the environment; and ii) 
maximize trust on the institutional environment’s use. 
These conflicting goals must be balanced well enough 
in order to encourage agents to increase their level of 
activity, when the agent population’s risk tolerance is 
unknown beforehand. 
In the following section we present an abstract 
model for contractual commitments and the adaptation 
approach that we take. Section 3 describes a simulation 
environment, and specifies the adaptation approach by 
describing how it is implemented and tested. Section 4 
presents some experiments. Section 5 concludes and 
describes related work. 
2. The model 
In our approach we take the stance that agents are 
truly autonomous, and thus cannot be forced to fulfill 
their obligations. The institution may, however, impose 
certain fines as deterrence sanctions: those fines are 
assumed to be fully regimented (that is, agents cannot 
escape them, e.g. because they were required, upon 
entering the institution, to make a deposit that is in 
control of the institution). Sanctions other than fines 
could also be envisaged as deterrence measures. 
We are mainly concerned with contracting 
scenarios, wherein agents make mutual commitments 
and create business expectations. Violations, even 
when handled by contractual norms, should be seen as 
exceptional situations. Hence, if a certain kind of 
violation becomes frequent, response should be taken 
through an increase of sanctions. 
2.1. Commitment trees 
In order to obtain a tractable model for handling 
contractual commitments, we use a tree-based 
representation for interdependent obligations. This 
representation is useful for understanding the 
simulation model that we describe later on. 
When establishing contracts, agents create a 
network of directed obligations, some of which are 
dependent on the fulfillment or violation of other 
obligations. Consider the following two-party contract: 
agent a will pay p units to agent b, after which b will 
deliver x to a. In case b fails to deliver, he must return 
p’=p+δ to b. This sequence of commitments is 
illustrated in Figure 1, in a tree-like structure – a 
commitment tree. Each node represents an obligation, 
and each labeled directed edge indicates, in the child 
node pointed to, what follows when the obligation 
contained in the parent node is fulfilled (Fulf) or 
violated (Viol). Note that in this simple example 
nothing is specified yet if agent a violates his 
commitment to pay p, nor if agent b violates his 
commitment to return p’. 
Figure 1. Sample commitment tree 
While this example shows a simple binary tree, one 
can imagine multi-party contracts with a potentially 
complex commitment tree structure1. 
The violation of an obligation with a prescribed 
sanction may simply denote a case where an agent 
preferred to incur the prescribed sanctions for matters 
of conflicting goals (e.g. he had another contract which 
                                                          
1 The tree will not be binary if each obligation fulfillment or 
violation may lead to more than one consequence. Also, if we 
consider that a norm can prescribe an obligation if two or more 
fulfillments or violations occur, we end-up with a directed acyclic 
graph instead of a tree, since each node may have more than one 
parent. However, this is not very common in the case of violations 
(which are our main concern here): each violation will typically be 
handled in isolation (as in the model of “reparation chains” in [13]).13.
Governatori, G. and A. Rotolo, Logic of Violations: A Gentzen System for Reasoning with Contrary-To-Duty Obligations. Australasian Journal of Logic, 2006. 4: p. 193-215.
was more important than this one, and could not stand 
for both). If such violation becomes frequent, however, 
this may denote a flaw in the normative system that 
agents are being able to exploit to their own advantage. 
2.2. Adaptation 
The importance of adaptation in a normative 
framework resides in the fact that contracts may be 
unfair in certain execution outcomes. If self-interested 
agents explore such flaws to their own profit, action 
should be taken in order to discourage such behaviors. 
In order to build a model that adapts the normative 
framework in a domain-independent way, we will 
concentrate on adding deterrence fines to the system 
(which are not violable), instead of changing the 
prescribed obligations in each violation situation. The 
normative framework’s adaptation is based on 
associating, with each obligation, a fine that can be 
strengthened or weakened (see Figure 2). With this 
approach, every obligation will have a (potentially null) 
fine to be imposed on the bearer in case of violation; 
this fine is added up to the violation consequence in the 
child node already in the tree, if there is one. 
Figure 2. Binary commitment tree2 with null fines 
In order to correctly model appropriate responses to 
specific situations, we need to assess how often an 
obligation is used, and how often it is violated. Fines 
will be updated according to these measurements. The 
basic principle that we rely on is that the strength of a 
fine should be directly proportional to its application 
frequency. As such, fines should increase when they 
are applied often, and decrease when they are not used. 
A low level of fine usage indicates that obligations are 
being fulfilled or they are not being used as often as 
desired: in both cases fines should be decreased, since 
they either are not needed or are inhibiting activity. On 
the other hand, a high level of fine usage means that 
agents still prefer to go through the sanction, and as 
such it should be increased as a deterrence mechanism. 
In summary, this approach tries to make fines (a) strong 
enough to discourage deviation and (b) weak enough to 
avoid unnecessary institutional control. 
                                                          
2 From now on, we will only consider the case for binary
commitment trees (this simplification does not limit the applicability 
















3. Simulation environment 
Aiming at the development of a simulation 
prototype that allows us to test the adaptation model 
briefly described above, we designed the following 
experimental scenario. 
A number of agents will be in the system, and each 
will be given the opportunity to sign a contract. The 
contract’s structure is defined by the number of 
enacting roles and by an underlying binary commitment 
tree (BCT from now on). Roles are used as bearers or 
counterparties of obligations in the tree. Furthermore, 
each obligation has an associated cost (to be supported 
by a fulfilling bearer) and benefit (to be collected by 
the counterparty of a fulfilled obligation). Figure 3 
summarizes the characterization of a commitment. 
Figure 3. A node in a BCT and its configuration 
When an agent decides to sign a contract, he will 
enact the corresponding commitment tree with a role 
assigned to him before contracting. We say that the 
state of a contract enactment is the commitment 
currently under appreciation. If the bearer of such a 
commitment is the agent that decided to contract, he 
will be asked for a play: either to fulfill or to violate 
such a commitment. If the commitment’s bearer is not 
the agent, the system will decide whether the 
commitment will be fulfilled or not, according to a 
uniform strategy. The current state will be updated 
according to the decision taken: if the choice is to 
fulfill, the state will become the root commitment of 
the fulfillment sub-tree; if the choice is to violate, the 
state will become the root commitment of the violation 
sub-tree. The contract terminates when the state 
reaches a null value (i.e. when no fulfillment/violation 
sub-tree exists upon a fulfill/violate decision). 
3.1. Agent decision-making 
Each agent has two distinct kinds of decisions to 
make. If he does not currently have an ongoing 
contract, he is given the opportunity to sign one. For 
that, a random role from the contract structure is 
selected and the agent is asked if he wants to contract 
with that role. Each agent is configured with a risk 
tolerance parameter Rt ∈ [0; 1[, which denotes his 
willingness to contract in the presence of violation 
fines. If Rt = 0, the agent will only decide to contract if 
he will be subject to no fines at all. On the other 
extreme, if Rt ? 1, the agent will always risk to 
contract, regardless of any fines. An agent will decide 
to contract depending on the highest fine that is 
associated with commitments for the assigned role. In 
order to contract, the following relation should be true: 
highestFine(role) ≤ b * Rt / (1 – Rt) (1) 
where b is a slope parameter associated with the 
agent’s budget. 
We assume that agents always prefer to contract, 
regardless of commitment costs or benefits. A contract 
is presumably beneficial to all partners should they 
fulfill all their commitments. Having said this, we allow 
a contract to be unbalanced or incorrect from a safeness 
point of view, in the sense discussed in [2]. In our case, 
we consent that participating in the contract may in 
some cases be worse-off than not participating, 
depending on the behavior of contractual partners. 
When an agent has an ongoing contract, whenever 
the contract’s state is a commitment where he is the 
bearer he will decide whether to fulfill or to violate 
such a commitment. Depending on a so-called in-
contract strategy, the agent will explore the contract’s 
BCT in order to decide which option is best for him. 
Such strategies may vary from simply comparing the 
cost of fulfillment with the applicable fine in case of 
violation, to computing the path with the best outcome 
from the whole BCT. Some possible strategies will be 
presented in section 4. 
Agents are essentially expected utility maximizers. 
This means that, in principle, they will fulfill 
obligations only when the expected outcome from this 
choice is better than the expected outcome from 
violating (according to his in-contract strategy). We do 
however embed in our agents some notion of social 
welfare, which impels them to fulfill even when they do 
not have a strict advantage in doing so. While for now 
we do not consider the effect of reputation in future 
contracts, we allow in our model that agents are not all 
equally self-interested. For that we introduce a social 
awareness parameter Sa ∈ [0; 1[. If Sa = 0, the agent 
will violate whenever the outcome from this choice is 
better than the outcome from fulfilling. On the other 
extreme, if Sa ? 1 the agent will always choose to 
fulfill. The agent will decide to fulfill an obligation o
whenever the following relation is true: 
violationOutcome(o) – fulfillmentOutcome(o) ≤
b * Sa / (1 – Sa) (2) 
where b is as before. The violation/fulfillment 
outcomes are calculated by the in-contract strategy. 
Fine
Obligation
Bearer: role, cost 
Counterparty: role, benefit
3.2. Fine update function 
In each simulation step, all agents running in the 
simulation will have a chance to play. After this, the 
contract structure will have a chance to adapt, that is, 
the fines associated to the BCT will be updated. Each 
fine is updated independently of all other fines. 
In order to delineate a fine update policy, we first 
need to define the goal function that will be pursued. 
As mentioned before, fine updates should take into 
account how often they are applied. We define a 
threshold parameter Th ∈ [0; 1] that indicates the 
highest percentage of fines that the system should 
accept as normal. For instance, with a value Th = 0.1
we are saying that if more than 10% of the agents 
running in the simulation violate a given obligation the 
normative system will raise the fine in the next step – in 
this case, we say that 10% of the total number of agents 
is the number of tolerated violations. Furthermore, 
since not all agents will be in the same state at a given 
time point, we adjust the threshold according to the 
number of agents that did in fact make a decision 
concerning the fulfillment or violation of a specific 
obligation (because they were in that state). For 
instance, if with a group of 1000 agents we have 10 
violations of a specific obligation in a simulation step, 
this may have a different response from the normative 
framework depending on the number of agents that 
went through that same obligation at that time step. If 
there were 10 play decisions taken on that obligation, 
this makes a 100% percentage of violations; if there 
were 100 plays, that percentage comes down to 10%. 
While in none of these cases we exceed 10% of the 
total number of agents (1000), it seems clear that the 
system should react on the former case. 
A state’s fine will be increased if the number of 
violations exceeds the following tolerated violations 
function: 
toleratedViolations = 
2*Th*Nag / (1 + e-(5/Nag)*x) – Th*Nag (3) 
where Nag is the number of agents running in the 
simulation and x is the number of agents that were in 
this state. This is a sigmoid function with an upper 
bound set at Th*Nag (a percentage of the total number 
of agents). The steepness parameter is 5/Nag, which 
makes the sigmoid curve approach the upper bound 
close to Nag, which is the ceiling for x (there can be no 
more than Nag agents at this state). 
If the number of violations does not exceed the 
number of tolerated violations, then the fine will be 
decreased. Fines are increased heavier than they are 
decreased. We have set an increase step of 0.1 and a 
decrease step of 0.01. Fines will be applied rounded to 
the first decimal place, which gives a sense that it takes 
ten simulation steps (without exceeding the tolerated 
violations function) to decrease the fine value. 
4. Experiments 
In this section we describe some experiments made 
using the described simulation environment and model. 
4.1. Experimental settings 
What we want to study with the simulation scenario 
described in the preceding section is whether the 
normative framework is able to adapt and stabilize fine 
changes in a situation with a static agent population. 
Furthermore, the system should keep fines as low as 
possible, while still conforming to the goal function 
outlined above. This is because the system aims to 
avoid excessive control and through that maximize 
agents’ contracting activity, which should be obtained 
with less risk exposure in an agent population with
unknown risk tolerance. 
If we change the agent population in the middle of 
the simulation, then we have a moving target setting, 
which is out of the scope of the experiments reported in 
this paper. However, since we lower fines whenever the 
tolerated violations are not exceeded, we believe that 
the system will quickly adapt in a moving target setting. 
4.1.1. Contract structures. Since we are not 
concerned with the correctness of the contract to be 
signed, we may experiment with a large number of 
different BCTs. Figure 4 shows some possibilities, all 
considering two roles only. For instance, (d) includes 
two complementary obligations 0 and 1, and their 
respective contrary-to-duties 3 and 2. We shall call 
obligation 1 the to-duty obligation of obligation 0. 
Figure 4. Binary commitment trees: each node Idi,j



















We will present some experimental results based on 
some of these BCTs. In all cases, obligation costs were 
set at 10.0 and benefits at 12.0 (setting benefits higher 
than costs tries to give all partners some gain when the 
contract is well-balanced). Also, fines were initialized 
at 0.0. 
4.1.2. Agents. As mentioned before, we aim at testing 
the normative framework’s adaptation when the agent 
population is unknown, concerning agents’ risk 
tolerance and social awareness. For that reason, all 
agents in the system have a uniform random 
distribution concerning the risk-tolerance and social-
awareness parameters. Also, concerning the use of 
these parameters the slope value b was set to 10.0. 
Several in-contract strategies can be devised, 
representing the reasoning abilities of agents when 
deciding whether to fulfill or violate an obligation. As 
explained in section 3.1, the in-contract strategy will be 
used to compute the fulfillment and violation outcomes 
at a given state. We consider the following simple 
strategies, which may have different relevance 
depending on the BCT at hand: 
i. Local: fulfillment cost vs. fine 
ii. LocalCtd: fulfillment cost vs. fine + contrary-
to-duty cost (ignore possible entitlements in 
case of fulfillment) 
iii. LocalTd: fulfillment cost + to-duty benefit vs. 
fine (ignore possible normative sanctions in 
case of violation) 
iv. LocalBoth: fulfillment cost + to-duty benefit 
vs. fine + contrary-to-duty cost 
v. FulfillmentBalance: balance if every 
participant fulfills the contract vs. fine 
vi. DoubleFulfillmentBalance: balance if every 
participant fulfills the contract vs. balance if 
every participant fulfills the contract from the 
contrary-to-duty obligation onwards – fine 
vii. BestPathCompliantPartners: best balance for 
every path in the BCT, assuming that contract 
partners always fulfill 
viii. BestPathMinimax: best balance for every 
possible path in the commitment tree, 
considering that contract partners will use the 
same strategy 
Strategies iii through vii assume that partners will 
always fulfill their obligations. Analyzing these 
strategies together with the BCTs depicted in Figure 4, 
we can see that, for instance, FulfillmentBalance will 
only make sense in tree (e), since in all other BCTs the 
same outcome can be achieved with less 
computationally demanding strategies. 
4.2. Experiments and results 
In all experiments a uniform strategy “always 
fulfill” was used by the system for commitments whose 
bearer is not a simulation agent. The violation 
threshold parameter Th was set to 0.1. Each simulation 
was run with 10000 agents and 1000 time steps. 
Figures 5-9 present the results of fine evolution in 
some possible combinations of BCTs and in-contract 
strategies. In BCT (c) a LocalTD strategy (Figure 5) is 
able to grab the benefit achieved from obligation 1 
when fulfilling obligation 0. Only the violation of 
obligation 1 is tempting, and thus the system adapted 
the corresponding fine. 
Figure 5. Fine evolution for BCT (c) and LocalTd
In BCT (d) the LocalTD strategy (Figure 6) impels 
agents to fulfill obligation 0. Agents that are more 
socially concerned will tend to fulfill obligation 1 with 
lower fines than other agents, hence the difference 
between fines 1 and 2. In the same scenario, 
BestPathMinimax (Figure 7) gives agents the ability of 
evaluating every possible outcome with rational plays 
from both contractual partners. Each agent playing in 
state 0 initially violates because he sees his partner 
preferring to violate obligation 1 (and 2), therefore 
giving him no benefit. However, when fines 2 and 3 are 
high enough, fines 0 and 1 are no longer necessary.
As for BCT (e), unlike the previous two contractual 
structures, this one is not profitable (with the complete 
fulfillment execution 0-1-2) for the agent playing at 
state 0, if we consider the values set for every 
obligation’s cost (10.0) and benefit (12.0). The 
DoubleFulfillmentBalance strategy (Figure 8) is able to 
detect the better path 0-4-5, causing a reaction of the 
normative system with a raise of fine 0. Without this 
escape, violating obligation 2 is a means of taking 
some profit out of the game, bringing a raise of fine 2. 
The BestPathMinimax strategy in this scenario (Figure 
9) makes up the most complex setting we have 
experimented. Starting at state 0, the best path when 
playing with a similar agent is initially to violate all 
obligations (including contrary-to-duties), bringing an 
outcome of 0. This is because the agent assumes that 
his partner will maximize his own profit, therefore 
preferring to violate at states 1 and 5. Fines at 
obligations 0 and 1 become ineffective as soon as fines 
associated with contrary-to-duties are high enough.
Figure 6. Fine evolution for BCT (d) and LocalTd
Figure 7. Fine evolution for BCT (d) and 
BestPathMinimax
Figure 8. Fine evolution for BCT (e) and
DoubleFulfillmentBalance
Figure 9. Fine evolution for BCT (e) and 
BestPathMinimax
With any combination of BCTs and in-contract 
strategies the system is able to adjust the deterrence 
sanction values to the behavior of an agent population, 
stabilizing fines after a period of time. We should 
emphasize that the system continuously tries to lower 
fines, which is observable by the slight fluctuations of 
fines towards the end of the curves in figures 5-9. 
Therefore, system imposed fine levels are the lowest 
that keep violations below the tolerated violations 
function. 
5. Conclusions and related work 
In this paper we have presented a simple model for 
the adaptation of deterrence sanctions used in a 
normative framework. We have shown that it is feasible 
to adapt deterrence levels to the behavior of an agent 
population. This is important when the normative space 
has imperfections that make the contracts to which 
norms apply unfair, opening the possibility for self-
interested agents to exploit their potential advantage. 
We have built an abstraction for contractual 
commitments by modeling their corresponding 
obligations in a binary commitment tree structure. In 
such a tree we are able to include both “to-duty” 
complementary obligations and contrary-to-duty 
retribution sanctions. 
The parameterization of agents with different social 
attitudes is common in computational models for social 
interactions. Agents range from selfish to respectful 
[14]. Respectful agents are those that internalize norms 
and fulfill obligations simply because they are 
obligations [15], irrelevant of there being associated 
sanctions in case of violation. Our social awareness 
parameter tries to take this heterogeneity of social 
attitudes into account. 
Influencing agent decision making regarding social 
commitments is generally conceived as social control 
[15], and is usually focused on enforcement, sanctions 
and reputation. A different perspective has been taken 
in [16], where some agents in the system are directly 
controlled by the system’s designer. Making such 
agents play specific strategies will lower the payoff of 
joint activities when uncontrolled agents play selfishly, 
therefore making them choose to fulfill. This seems 
unrealistic in contracting scenarios. Yet, the authors 
have made a theoretical analysis in scenarios where 
uncontrolled agents are expected utility maximizers 
and when they are reinforcement learners. Such 
scenarios can be tested in our simulation model as well. 
Dynamic properties of normative systems have been 
studied from different perspectives. In [17] norms are 
seen as patterns of behavior that may emerge bottom-
up from agent interactions. In our case, however, the 
normative system is external to the agents, and we seek 
to adapt it to a specific agent population in order to 
pursue an overall system goal. 
Self-adaptation of institutional normative 
environments is also studied in [18], with two 
significant differences to our approach. First, their 
adaptation model is based on the definition of domain-
dependent transition functions, stating what specific 
change should be made in a specific norm when some 
goal specification is not met. Second, their model does 
not assume strict liability; therefore, agents are able to 
violate norms while not being detected. 
In this paper we have not considered the influence 
of reputation on agent’s contractual behavior. It has 
been argued [12] that in the presence of reputation 
mechanisms there is a lesser need for deterrence 
policies. We believe that positive reputation updates 
triggered by the normative environment may be an 
incentive for agents to fulfill their commitments. 
Our simulation environment opens up the possibility 
for several studies, such as the impact of changing risk-
tolerance and social-awareness parameter distributions 
in the value of imposed fines [19]. We have shown that 
under uniform random distributions the system is able 
to adapt by appropriately raising and stabilizing fine 
values. 
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